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‘Should we have stopped?’ Deadly wildfire investigation prompts hard questions from firefighters, families

This photo was taken by Rifle squad boss Emily Barker less than an hour before she and her colleagues would deploy their fire shelters.
Emily Barker via U.S. Wildland Fire Service
This photo was taken by Rifle Helitack squad boss Emily Barker less than an hour before she and her colleagues would deploy their fire shelters.

Families, firefighters and agencies are reacting to the findings of a federal investigation report released last week that detailed a series of failures leading to the deaths of four wildland firefighters this summer.

Cascading communication breakdowns, extreme weather and wind-driven fire behavior described as “unfathomable” were all factors, along with federal staffing shortages, inadequate air support and other serious issues, according to the report.

“The Knowles Serious Accident Investigation Team mourns those we have lost and holds the integrity of this report and a commitment to learning in paramount importance,” the executive summary reads. “In wildland fire, we must honor through learning.”

A group of five firefighters were battling two of a number of blazes near the Colorado-Utah border on June 27. They deployed their fire shelters in a last-ditch attempt at survival, but four ultimately perished.

Emily Barker, Nick Hutcherson and Sydney Watson died that day. Nathan Matthews died of his injuries a month later.

Left to right: Emily Barker, Nick Hutcherson, Nathan Matthews and Sydney Watson.
U.S. Wildland Fire Service
Left to right: Emily Barker, Nick Hutcherson, Nathan Matthews and Sydney Watson.

It was the deadliest incident of a deadly fire season that has left family, firefighters and their advocates mourning. They’re also left with many questions that aim to get to the heart of what happened — and how similar tragedies can be avoided in the future.

“Who was responsible for protecting Nick as conditions deteriorated?” Hutcherson’s family members asked in written statements in the wake of the report’s release. “And, why was he not withdrawn before his escape disappeared?”

Former federal fire scientist Dave Calkin said the report was “outstanding in describing all of the things that went on.”

“But there was never the question of, ‘Should we have stopped? When should we have stopped?’” he said. “And, from my perspective, we should have never started that day.”

‘Hot as hell’

Barker was a Rifle Helitack squad leader and helicopter manager that day, based out of Rifle, Colorado. At 3:19 p.m. on June 27, with the heat of the racing inferno on them, she commanded the four other firefighters battling blazes near the Colorado-Utah border to “pull shelters.”

Fire shelters are bivouac-like sacks with an aluminum outer layer that reflects radiant heat — last-resort tools that often mean the difference between life and death.

The flaming front arrived within seconds of the deployment. Surrounded by blasting heat and fire, the unnamed sole survivor fought to keep their shelter in place. It had all happened so fast that they didn’t have time to put on their gloves or helmet.

“Hot as hell,” is how they described it.

This map shows the multiple fires burning the day of the Knowles tragedy. The five firefighters involved in the entrapment were on the Knowles and Gore fires.
U.S. Wildland Fire Service
This map shows the multiple fires burning the day of the Knowles tragedy. The five firefighters involved in the entrapment were on the Knowles and Gore fires.

Two-and-a-half hours later, after enduring temperatures ranging from 400 to 1,200 degrees, Matthews and the unnamed survivor would be airlifted from the site.

The nearly 100-page report, produced jointly by the U.S. Wildland Fire Service and the U.S. Forest Service, exhaustively details the hours leading up to, and following, Barker’s command. It documents a chaotic response amid extreme fire weather, strained communication systems and limited air support as a series of fires in western Colorado burned into each other.

It was based on interviews with dozens of firefighters, pilots, dispatchers and leadership involved in the response, including the burnover survivor, as well as dispatch logs, photos, videos and other resources.

The five firefighters were attempting to contain two smaller blazes — the Knowles and Gore — in a rugged and remote part of Colorado’s Mesa County when a third fire, the Snyder, overtook the crew.

This video included in the report shows high winds pushing a retardant drop.

Starting shortly after noon, the fire sprinted more than 7 miles in less than three hours, tearing through a “complex broken mesa and canyon topography.” Witnesses described the fire behavior as “shocking” and “unfathomable” to investigators.

‘Felt like chaos’ 

Investigators and interviewees highlighted aging radio infrastructure and unreliable coverage that hampered communications, a dispatch center reliant largely on trainees, difficulty communicating the location of firefighters on the ground and windy conditions that limited air support during the time the team was overrun by fire.

“From the moment I walked on the floor at 0830 it felt like chaos,” one aircraft dispatch trainee told investigators about the day of the tragedy.

One pilot interviewed for the report told investigators that the conditions were “by far the roughest” of their career. Another said they had “never fought fire in that kind of wind before.” An air tanker pilot had to jettison their load, which they described as "the scariest thing I have ever experienced."

The investigators concluded that “no single decision or system failure fully explains the outcome.”

“Instead,” they wrote, “the events reveal the cumulative effects of known limitations operating under extraordinary tempo and conditions.”

Riva Duncan is the president of the advocacy group Grassroots Wildland Firefighters. She has followed the deadly season closely and said the investigative report was “extremely thorough work,” and a “really difficult” and “honorable task.”

“Nothing is earth-shatteringly new,” Duncan said. “It often comes down to communication difficulties, fire behavior, chaos. That's frustrating, right? That's frustrating to me, that we keep making the same mistakes, we keep having the same outcomes.”

For example, in the 2003 Cramer Fire, investigators found that “helicopter retrieval became the primary escape route to safety.” There were also “inadequate resources,” and failures to clearly communicate crucial information, like plans for placing lookouts, who keep eyes on the fire as their colleagues work.

“Aviation resources over the fire could not function full time as lookouts for ground crews given their other duties and responsibilities,” the executive summary continued.

In the 1994 South Canyon Fire — less than 100 miles east of the Knowles tragedy — investigators found that “strategy and tactics were not adjusted to compensate for observed and potential extreme fire behavior. Tactics were also not adjusted when Type I crews and air support did not arrive on time on July 5 and 6.”

“[The Knowles] report is showing that we have continued systemic failures that haven't been addressed,” Duncan added. “Those things need to be addressed. That's, to me, how we honor these four young people who gave the ultimate sacrifice.”

The Mountain West News Bureau requested responses from the U.S. Wildland Fire Service, which oversees Interior Department firefighters, to the questions, criticisms and concerns shared by Duncan, Calkin and Hutcherson’s family members.

“The serious accident investigation was conducted to establish facts and identify lessons learned,” the agency told the bureau. “We take the findings seriously and are committed to reviewing them and identifying appropriate actions to strengthen firefighter safety and reduce the risk of similar tragedies.”

Air support challenges

From 2:30 p.m. — about 45 minutes before the team deployed shelters — to 4:30 p.m., the area where the firefighters died was without aerial resources monitoring the multiple fires, according to the report.

That’s because when one air team returned to the Grand Junction airport to refuel at 2:30 p.m., a relief team was unable to take off due to high crosswinds. During this period, the helitack team on the ground and the helicopter tending to them — referred to in the report as “Helicopter A” — were unaware they had no support.

Helitack crews respond to fires in helicopters, and some even rappel out of them down to incidents.

“Ground firefighters, helitack leadership, and Helicopter A pilot unknowingly operated under the false mental model that air attack was actively monitoring the main fire and would warn them if it posed an imminent threat,” the report stated.

At the same time, a radio problem meant that updates intended to communicate the location of the crew on the ground to air support were instead going to an air team on another fire 30 miles away.

According to the report, the helicopter pilot was among the first to determine that the conditions warranted an immediate extraction. On a brief stop to refuel, a supervisor asked the pilot if they felt it was the time for an evacuation.

“Without hesitation, Pilot 1 said yes, we should get them right now,” the report states.

‘She was offering me her shelter’ 

The helicopter refueled and departed eight minutes before the team would deploy fire shelters, with their radio transmission once again going to the wrong air attack team 30 miles away. When the firefighters on the ground received news that they were to be picked up, they made plans to head to the landing site.

Barker called Rifle Helitack’s superintendent on her cellphone, according to the report.

“Oh, we got a spot fire. I gotta go,” she said at the end of their short conversation.

Large portions of the investigation are sourced from interviews with the sole survivor of the burnover, the unnamed Firefighter 5.

According to their account, once the team made the decision to flee, smoke was so thick they needed GPS to find the location where they’d been dropped off. The five firefighters found their way to the landing spot but it became clear the helicopter could not land in the high winds and dense smoke.

“That’s it. We gotta pull shelters,” Firefighter 5 recalls Barker saying.

Firefighter 5 told investigators he struggled to open his shelter, though he was eventually able to deploy and use it. While he was struggling, Barker offered to help.

“I thought she was talking about radios, but she was offering me her shelter,” the surviving firefighter told investigators.

This photo shows the shelter deployment site. The gray boxes represent where the five firefighters deployed: 1 is Nathan Matthews, 2 is Emily Barker, 3 is Nicholas Hutcherson, 4 is Sydney Watson and 5 is the unnamed survivor.
U.S. Wildland Fire Service
This photo shows the shelter deployment site. The gray boxes represent where the five firefighters deployed: 1 is Nathan Matthews, 2 is Emily Barker, 3 is Nicholas Hutcherson, 4 is Sydney Watson and 5 is the unnamed survivor.

The surviving firefighter and Matthews were airlifted once another helicopter was finally able to land. As information about the shelter deployment and attempts to land were being coordinated, news began to filter out to others working the fire. One helicopter crewmember assigned to the area recalled passing the news of a shelter deployment along to a smokejumper — an elite firefighter who parachutes into blazes.

“At that point, I started bawling,” the crewmember said. “I hugged the smokejumper and we just sat by these rocks for a long time, just listening to the broken traffic.”

Findings and recommendations

A “working version” of the investigation report was “inadvertently posted” online last Thursday before being replaced by the “final, approved report” later that day, the Wildland Fire Service told the Mountain West News Bureau. However, Colorado Public Radio and the Mountain West News Bureau downloaded and reviewed the first version as well. It contained seven pages of more than 20 findings, underlying causes and recommendations. The official, publicly available version has 19 findings and no listed causes or recommendations.

Recommendations in the initial publication include further training for dispatchers, a number of communication technology improvements, the hiring of a telecommunications specialist, filling preexisting vacancies on Rifle Helitack, improving fire shelter training and many other, often technical changes.

To address the lack of aerial surveillance as the tragedy unfolded, the working version recommends combining incidents under “a single aerial supervisor” when there are multiple fires in an area to “promote incident coordination and maintain a common operating picture.”

It also notes that the Rifle crewmembers “were inserted into small remote fires with reliance on being removed by a helicopter.” The earlier version recommends “training for all firefighters … to build in common delays and barriers to extraction flights,” like high winds, smoke or mechanical issues, and to consider other means of getting away from dangerous fire, like hiking out or building a safety zone.

The Wildland Fire Service said those interested in the investigation should “refer to the final report.”

‘Action is not feasible today’

Calkin, the fire researcher, agrees that many of the findings and recommendations are important and could improve firefighter safety. But he argued that the tragedy calls for more fundamental considerations.

“We had a fire weather forecast that called for these extreme winds, and the forecast was historic. It was something that firefighters in their careers — even long careers — probably had never seen in this area and yet we went about our business like it was just another challenging day,” he said. “With those winds predicted, aviation is likely to be relatively ineffective and unlikely to fly at key times and yet it was so central to their strategy. The communication systems failed left and right, and they highlighted that throughout the report. The challenges of managing across jurisdictions created even more complexity.”

That complexity, he argued, paired with the extreme weather, “suggested a need for somebody — for a system — to say ‘this is not feasible today. Action is not feasible today.’”

“And yet that never happened,” Calkin said.

In response, the Wildland Fire Service said that “often, acting early to contain a wildfire while it is small is the safest option.”

“The Snyder Fire ultimately required hundreds of firefighters to respond, cost millions of dollars in suppression operations alone, triggered evacuations of recreationists and residents, and damaged thousands of acres of natural resources,” the statement continued. “The impact this wildfire had despite early interagency suppression efforts speaks to the extreme risk it posed.”

This video shows extreme behavior on the Snyder Fire at around 1:30 p.m.

The report also notes that fire response in the Black Ridge Canyons Wilderness, where a number of the blazes have burned, is guided by the goal of minimizing the spread of cheatgrass — an invasive and highly flammable fuel.

“This policy framing drove the decision to insert helitack firefighters onto small wilderness starts on a day with extreme fire weather conditions forecast,” the report reads.

Calkin frankly acknowledged that his proposal to pull back when weather and fire conditions are too dangerous will result in losses. But he said that the report “laid bare some of the systemic issues that have not been addressed,” and until they’re resolved, heightened caution is in order.

“Yes, losses will occur. We will lose some homes. We will lose ranching infrastructure,” Calkin said.

“But under certain conditions, with [a] system that is so close to breaking, that is so strained right now,” he continued, “people at leadership levels have to step back and say, ‘it is okay to lose today because we aren't going to win. All we can do is lose more.’ And I don't think I've seen that.”

In its response, the Wildland Fire Service said that firefighter safety is its “top priority.”

“Under the Department of the Interior's suppression policy, fire managers retain the authority to select appropriate tactics based on conditions on the ground, such as fire behavior, terrain, weather and operational risks,” the agency continued. “The policy does not encourage firefighters to take unnecessary risks in pursuit of suppression objectives.”

Critics have raised concerns about not just Interior’s mandate this season to aggressively extinguish all fires, which echoes direction given to the U.S. Forest Service by its parent agency the Department of Agriculture, but also its directive that the "default" should be working right on the edge of fires to halt them, known as direct attack.

Democratic Colorado Sen. John Hickenlooper said he appreciated Interior making the report public, but argued that it “doesn’t give us satisfying answers.”

“Faster, hotter wildfires are our new normal,” he said in a social media post. “We need to adequately staff our wildfire response teams and question whether DOI’s full suppression strategy is the right policy.”

Family demands accountability

Family members of Hutcherson are also demanding answers about why their loved one was in the path of a deadly fire.

Nick Hutcherson
Courtesy Hutcherson family
Nick Hutcherson

“Nick’s commitment to serving others does not establish that this assignment was necessary or safe,” his mother Lisa Hutcherson said in a family statement provided to the Mountain West News Bureau. “The report itself says the downwind values were not imminently threatened. We will not stand by as officials claim that Nick and his crew were out there to protect human lives, when this was a no man’s land with no values at risk.”

“Calling the fire behavior unexpected is a cop-out. Severe winds were forecast. Colorado is known to be one of the windiest states in the nation. Nearby fire was growing rapidly. Aviation was becoming unreliable. Those warnings demanded reassessment,” his father Ron Hutcherson said. “Our son’s safety should never have depended on someone predicting the exact path of the fire.”

Ron Hutcherson, Nick Hutcherson's father, at Rifle Interagency Fire Station Memorial in Colorado
Courtesy Hutcherson family
Ron Hutcherson, Nick Hutcherson's father, at Rifle Interagency Fire Station Memorial in Colorado

“Honoring Nick means confronting the failures that put him in danger and making sure the people responsible for firefighter safety are held accountable for doing their jobs,” they said in the joint statement.

In response, the Wildland Fire Service called the losses devastating.

“The loss of four wildland firefighters in the Knowles Fire tragedy is devastating, and our thoughts remain with their families, friends and fellow firefighters,” it said. “We recognize the concerns raised by the Hutcherson family and the importance of understanding the circumstances surrounding this tragedy.”

So far this season, 21 people have died fighting fire, above the 10-year average of 15.5 fireline deaths.

In August, Reuters reported that incidents in which firefighters were trapped by flames — like the Rifle Helitack crew — were at record highs. A Mountain West News Bureau analysis of federal Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center data showed that the seven so-called entrapment deaths so far this season account for more than half of all entrapment deaths since 2020.

For Grassroot’s Duncan, the Knowles tragedy, and the whole brutal season, are “telling a story about the future of the wildfire crisis in America and across the world.”

“Firefighters want to fight fire,” she said. “But we don't want them to die doing it.”

This story was produced by the Mountain West News Bureau, a collaboration between Boise State Public Radio, Wyoming Public Media, Nevada Public Radio, KUNR in Nevada, KUNC in Northern Colorado, KANW in New Mexico, Colorado Public Radio and KJZZ in Arizona as well as NPR, with support from affiliate newsrooms across the region. Funding for the Mountain West News Bureau is provided in part by the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and Eric and Wendy Schmidt.

As Boise State Public Radio's Mountain West News Bureau reporter, I try to leverage my past experience as a wildland firefighter to provide listeners with informed coverage of a number of key issues in wildland fire. I’m especially interested in efforts to improve the famously challenging and dangerous working conditions on the fireline.
Tom Hesse joined Colorado Public Radio in 2023 as the Western Slope Producer for Colorado Matters.

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